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1. Introduction 
The growth of an economy depends, amongst other factors, on the amount of effort that the 
individuals provide in the production and development processes. When individual effort 
contributions create positive externalities for the entire economy (e.g. through technological 
spillover, increased tax income, etc.), the added benefit typically is divided up according to 
the distribution of property rights in the economy. Since the provision of effort is costly and 
to some extent non-observable (or not easily verifiable), there is usually scope both for 
cooperative behavior that enhances economic output and for free-riding behavior that 
hampers it. If individuals in this framework condition their effort choices on social parameters  
such as the level or the genesis of income inequality, the societal configuration may have a 
significant impact on economic growth.  
In fact, Knack and Keefer (1997) find empirical evidence for a negative correlation between 
income inequality and growth. They conjecture that inequality harms growth because it 
impairs “social capital,” (i.e. trust in people and institutions).1 Glaeser et al. (2003), however, 
argue that inequality is not harmful for social capital per se, but only in connection with some 
form of “institutional weakness.” They model a society with a weak legal system and show 
that inequality may substantially reduce the level of investments because investors fear the 
expropriation of their expected returns by the rich who can bribe their way out of the 
prosecution by the corrupt courts. Hence, the combination of inequality and a weak legal 
system impedes efficient investments, thus leading to low levels of economic growth. This 
                                                        
1 Although the cross-section studies provide empirical insights on the macro level, they are bound to leave 
questions concerning the microeconomic foundations unanswered. For a critical assessment of the cross-section 
analyses and an overview of possible channels of interaction between inequality and growth see Aghion et al. 
(1999) as well as Barro (2000).  
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link between inequality, corruption, and growth finds support in the numerous surveys in 
which business people sound their concern for corruption and preferential treatment 
(Lambsdorff 2002). 
In this paper, we focus on the negative effect of the interaction of inequality and institutional 
structure on growth. Our idea is that the same level of inequality can affect cooperative 
behavior in different ways, depending on the circumstances under which it has historically 
emerged. When inequality in the distribution of property rights is perceived as resulting from 
the unfair actions of a few powerful agents (“self-serving dictators”), the level of trust in the 
society deteriorates, free-riding increases and the willingness of individuals to cooperate 
declines, but when inequality is perceived as resulting from a fair procedure,2 we conjecture 
that trust and cooperation are unaffected.  
Typically procedures are deemed fair if they create a “level playing field” that ex-ante 
provides all individuals with an equal opportunity for success. In this sense, randomly 
drawing prizes from the same distribution is considered a fair procedure because it provides 
equal chances ex-ante while not (necessarily) providing equal payoffs ex-post (Bolton et al. 
2005). Obviously, a fair random procedure is not equivalent to free market interaction. In the 
latter case, individual skills, knowledge, and information can decisively affect the outcomes. 
However, if we assume that the individual traits are randomly distributed, the outcomes of the 
free market interaction are also randomly distributed ex-ante and, thus, to some degree 
comparable to the outcomes of a fair random procedure not based on individual traits. In fact, 
Hoffmann et al. (1994) show that an unequal distribution of property rights (and outcomes) is 
                                                        
2 Independent from our work Bolton et al. (2005) investigated the effect of the fairness of the procedure that is 
used for selecting outcomes. Their focus is on the acceptability of unfair outcomes, given the (non) existence of 
fair procedures for selecting the outcomes. Our focus is on the effect a procedure has on the willingness to 
cooperate in a dynamic environment  
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more likely to be considered fair if it results from a skill-based competition that gives all 
parties equal opportunities. Apparently the distribution of individual traits is thought to be 
random and the market competition is considered to be a fair procedure.  
We take three steps to find evidence for our conjecture. We first introduce and analyze a 
dynamic game that captures the main features of the situation that we have in mind. Next, we 
report a laboratory experiment of that game, comparing the degree of cooperation in the case 
when inequality is a consequence of unfair actions to the case where inequality results from a 
fair random  procedure. Finally, we run a few simple regression analyses of macro data in the 
search of some basic empirical support for our main hypothesis. 
The game we introduce is a dynamic 3-person 2-period game with one “rich” and two “poor” 
individuals. In each period, individuals choose either to cooperate (i.e. increase the total social 
product), to free-ride (i.e. increase the own relative payoff), or to destroy the current period’s 
payoffs of all the individuals in the economy, including the own. Free-riding is the 
individually optimal action, while mutual cooperation leads to the efficient outcome. The 
destruction action is clearly dominated, but provides a strong means of punishment.  
Apart from the destruction action, which is meant to represent all forms of social unrest 
including strikes, sabotage actions, or even civil wars, there are three main differences 
between our game and a standard public good game. First, unlike standard public good games 
in which the investments are taken out of the individual endowments, our endowments only 
represent property rights that define the portion of the social output to which each individual 
is entitled. Second, the investments in our game are made in terms of work effort that can 
either be invested in the total production output of the economy (i.e. in the public good) or 
can be “saved” to increase the (on the job) leisure of the individual (i.e. reducing effort cost is 
the private good). Finally, the third main difference to standard static public good games is 
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that increasing the public good (i.e. the production output) has positive dynamic effects since 
the output level in each period depends not only on the work effort exerted in the period, but 
also on the output level of the previous period. The notion is that a high previous period 
output provides the economy with a high level of capital stock that enhances the productivity 
in the current period.  
There is inequality in the model because the individual earnings from the social product are 
proportional to individual endowments (i.e. they are greater for the rich than for the poor). 
Hence, being poor in this game means having a smaller share of the property rights to the 
social output than the rich. Just as in Sadrieh and Verbon (2006), the degree of inequality is 
varied. The important new feature of this study is that, in one treatment, the degree of 
inequality is chosen by the rich individual (the dictator) before the interaction starts. Hence, 
in our dictator treatment we sometimes observe a high inequality economy DicHi (Gini-
coefficient .6) and sometime a low inequality economy DicLo (Gini-coefficient .1), depending 
on the choice made by the rich individual. Our experimental control treatment consists of two 
settings where the inequality is fixed by nature: in NatHi the high inequality economy and in 
NatLo the low inequality economy are implemented at random by the experimenter. 
Our main hypothesis is that the cooperation by the poor is on a much lower level when the 
high inequality setting is chosen by the rich (the dictator) than when it is implemented by the 
experimenters (by nature). In contrast, when the rich deliberately choose the low inequality 
setting, we expect that the poor engage in even more cooperation than in a low inequality 
setting fixed by nature. Hence, we expect the reciprocal behavior of the poor in the dictator 
treatment to lead to a clearly negative effect of inequality choice on growth, while in the 
nature treatment we expect to replicate the neutrality finding of Sadrieh and Verbon.  
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The experimental results are in line with our three hypotheses. When implemented by nature 
(i.e. by a random draw), inequality has no effect whatsoever on the level of cooperation. In 
contrast, when implemented by the choice of the rich dictator, choosing high (low) inequality 
leads to a significantly lower (higher) level of cooperation by the poor than in the nature 
treatment. Hence, we find a strong and significantly negative effect of inequality on growth, 
but only when inequality results from deliberate actions of the rich dictator.
3
  
Our experimental results suggest that the willingness to initiate and sustain cooperation in a 
society crucially depends on the historic process that created the distribution of wealth. This 
means that simply correlating inequality to growth may miss an important aspect of the issue, 
namely the genesis of inequality. We expect to find a negative correlation between inequality 
and growth only when inequality has emerged due to discriminating and corrupt actions of the 
rich and powerful, but not when it is the result of differences in capabilities and preferences in 
an otherwise just society. Thus, inequality arising in an economy that treats all individuals in 
an unbiased way and gives them equal opportunities should have a different effect on 
economic development than inequality arising in corrupt and politically biased societies. We 
provide basic empirical support for this hypothesis in a simple regression analysis in section 
5. Preceding that section, we introduce our model in section 2 and report on the experiment in 
sections 3 and 4. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                        
3 Our results seem related to the literature on reciprocal responses that asserts that an agent’s response not only 
depends on the consequences, but also on the intentions of other agents’ actions. Rabin (1993) introduces a first 
formal model that is enhanced by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Blount (1995) and Falk et al. (2000) find 
more reciprocation to human than to the randomized first movers. Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) show that the 
level of positive reciprocity is higher when punishment is possible, but deliberately not chosen, than when 
punishment is not possible in the first place. 
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2. The Model  
We assume there are n individuals i = 1,...,n with capital endowments, 0>iω . All capital is 
productive, and individuals can generate a return on the total capital available by exerting 
effort iσ ( .,...,1 ni = ). Effort can be interpreted as the time or attention an individual 
contributes to the production process. All individual’s efforts are perfect substitutes in 
generating returns on capital (i.e. the marginal productivity of effort is the same for every 
individual). The efforts iσ that are exerted by the individuals ( .,...,1 ni = ) are aggregated to 
form total labor input in production. Total output iif ωσσω ΣΣ=),(  is distributed in 
proportion to the capital endowments (i.e. the endowments are ownership rights to society’s 
return on efforts).  The individual’s effort involves a cost (e.g. a decrease in utility due to the 
loss of leisure) that is borne by the individual himself. As in Aghion et al. the cost incurred by 
individual i is proportional to total capital accumulated in the economy and the squared 
individual efforts, 2/),( 2 iic ωσσω Σ= .
4 The payoff of individual i  at the end of a period is 
equal to his share ii ωω Σ/  of the total product minus effort cost: 
.2/),(),()/( 2
1
j
1
ii
n
j
i
n
j
jii cf ωσσωσωσωωωpi Σ−∑=−∑=
==
   (1) 
Notice that the individual effort choices have the character of voluntary contributions to a 
public good: all members of the society gain when an individual exerts productive effort, but 
the cost of exerting the effort is borne by the individual alone. Moreover, if no individual 
contributes to the generation of a return on investment (i.e. nj ,...,1,0j ==σ ) everyone’s 
Page 7 of 37 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
7 
gross and net return will be zero. It can readily be calculated that for any vector of 
contributions jσ  by the other individuals, the best response of player i is 
./
1
ji ∑=
=
n
j
i ωωσ        (2) 
Notice that, according to equation (2), it will always be optimal to provide effort (i.e. 0>iσ ), 
irrespective of the effort provided by the others. Thus, the equilibrium will not be at a corner 
of the action space. In our experiment, subjects had to choose between playing the 
equilibrium strategy or playing cooperatively. Regarding the latter, we can formulate a social-
welfare function and maximize this function with respect to individual efforts. As is well-
known, the choice of a social-welfare function depends on a number of social value 
judgments. Although the details of any given specification may affect behavior to some 
extent, we believe that the main impact of any form of cooperative play stems from the 
mutual increase in payoffs. Hence, avoiding the discussions on value judgments, we have 
chosen an underlying cooperative structure that is simple to implement experimentally and 
that leads to substantial payoff increases for all parties when compared to equilibrium. The 
following specification, in which a constant amount of effort (.25) is added to every player’s 
equilibrium effort, satisfied these criteria: 
.25.0+= i
C
i σσ        (3) 
Next period’s endowment is the discounted sum of this period’s endowment and payoff that is 
defined by (1), that is, )(1 tii
t
i ωpiρω +=+ where ρ  is a discount factor. (For the experiment, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 We introduce this cost function because it generates a convenient description of equilibrium behavior. The 
interpretation for this specification, apart from the familiar U-shaped form, is that as the economy becomes more 
prosperous, the utility loss of providing a certain amount of effort increases.   
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we set 3/2=ρ ). In the next period, with the updated wealth levels, the individual again must 
decide whether to play the stage game Nash equilibrium strategy, as defined by (2), or to play 
cooperatively, as defined by (3). The payoff of the new period is again determined by (1), but 
now for the updated values of the individual endowments. The total payoff of each individual 
is obtained by adding up all period payoffs. The total payoff, thus, indicates the absolute 
growth an individual has realized on his initial endowment. The individual rate of growth can 
then be obtained by simply dividing the total payoff by the initial endowment. 
Social unrest is one possible response of the poor to inequality. Especially in dictatorial and 
corrupt societies, violent distributive struggles regularly erupt that often destroy substantial 
parts of the economy’s productive capital. It is, of course, difficult to model the possibility of 
social unrest in laboratory experiments. However, it is possible to give subjects the possibility 
to bring about payoff consequences that are similar to those arising from violent social unrest. 
To do so, we give every individual the option to destroy the entire current production of the 
economy, after each period of the game. If destruction is chosen by any single individual, the 
payoffs of all individuals for the current round are zero and the endowments retain the 
original previous period size. In particular, if in all periods at least one member chooses the 
destruction option, perfect income equality is established because the total payoff of every 
individual is zero.5 Since the destruction choice is always strictly dominated by non-
destruction, the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the game consists of all players choosing 
stage game equilibrium strategies (as in equation (2)) without choosing the destruction action 
at any point in the game.  
                                                        
5 A number of experimental studies have shown that subjects are willing to incur a substantial loss, if necessary, 
in order to avoid a large income inequality. For example, in ultimatum games (Güth 1995, Roth 1995), 
responders reject up to 40% of the benefits of trade just to avoid an unfair 40%-60% division of the surplus. The 
phenomenon that subjects are willing to pay a high price to reduce income inequality is observed not only in the 
ultimatum game, but also in other games (see e.g. Abbink et al. 2000, Bosman and van Winden 2002). 
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3. Experimental Conditions and Procedures  
The dynamic effort provision game described in the previous section was played in four 
experimental conditions. In every condition, an observation consisted of 3 players (that are 
called “an economy” in the following) with a total endowment of 300. In the low inequality 
setting, the rich had an endowment of 120, while the endowment of the poor was 90. In the 
high inequality setting, the endowments were 220 for the rich and 40 for the poor. In each 
session of the nature treatment, the experimenter determined one of the two possible 
distributions of endowments and informed the subjects before the game started. In the dictator 
treatment, the experimenter informed the subjects that the rich individual will choose one of 
the two possible distributions before the game starts. After this choice was made the subjects 
were informed on the chosen distribution of endowments and the game started. This method 
of determining the initial endowments was the only difference between the treatments. 
Combining the method of distribution selection (nature vs. dictator) with the two possible 
outcomes (low inequality vs. high inequality) gives us the four experimental conditions 
NatLo, NatHi, DicLo, DicHi that are summarized in table 1. 
In all conditions, a two-period version of the dynamic game was played. In each period, 
players first chose their effort levels. They could choose to act cooperatively or to free-ride 
(i.e. play Nash equilibrium strategy). After all effort choices were made, subjects received 
feedback on all choices and payoff consequences in their economy. Then, each subject was 
given the opportunity to destroy the period’s payoffs of all individuals in the economy 
(including their own payoff). In the second period of the game, the same decisions had to be 
taken. After the second period had been completed, subjects received their final payoffs. All 
actions were presented to the subjects in neutral terms: the free-riding and cooperative actions 
were called “A” and “B,” respectively, and the payoff destruction action was called “reset.” 
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Table 1 – Experimental Conditions 
Treatment 
Distribution is 
determined 
Inequality level 
(Gini coefficient) 
endowments 
(rich, poor, poor) 
number of 
subjects 
Number of 
independent 
observations 
NatLo by nature Low (.10) (120, 90, 90) 21 7 
NatHi by nature High (.60) (220, 40, 40) 24 8 
DicLo by  dictator Low (.10) (120, 90, 90) 24 8 
DicHi by  dictator High (.60) (220, 40, 40) 24 8 
. 
All sessions took place at the CentERlab at Tilburg University. The subjects were student 
volunteers who were hired via public recruitment on campus. Most of them were first year 
students in economics, business, and social sciences. Upon entering the laboratory, subjects 
were asked to draw a card from a covered deck. The randomly drawn card determined the 
table number at which they were seated. The matching of the tables into economies and the 
roles of the players had been randomly determined before the experiment started. 
The game was extensively explained to the subjects. After subjects had read the instructions 
(reproduced in Appendix A)6, they were asked to answer two guided practice questions that 
tested their understanding of the game. All subjects successfully solved the control questions. 
In total, 93 subjects (forming 31 economies) participated in the experiment. The distribution 
of economies over the treatments is given in Table 1. Incidentally, exactly one half of the rich 
subjects in the dictator treatment opted for the low inequality and one half opted for the high 
inequality distribution. Each subject participated only in one session. All sessions were held 
in May, June, and September 2002.  
The experiment was run with paper and pencil. Students were seated in cubicles and were 
asked not to communicate. The payoff information was presented to subjects in tables (see 
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Appendix B). The tables were organized so that each subject saw the own payoffs in the first 
column and the payoffs of the other players in the other two columns. Using the tables, the 
subjects could quickly “look forward” through both periods of the dynamic game.  
Subjects did not know the identity of the other subjects in their economy. This was guaranteed 
because there were always more than three (usually 24) subjects present in each session. The 
decision sheets (see Appendix C) were administered to all subjects at once. After subjects 
made their decisions, these were recorded by the experimenters. Only after all subjects had 
made their first decision did the experimenters fill-in the first-period choices of the members 
of the corresponding economy on each subject’s decision sheet. Next all subjects were given 
the opportunity to decide whether to destroy the output of the economy. (This option is called 
“Reset” on the decision sheet). Again, the decisions were recorded and only passed on after 
all subjects had made a decision. The procedure was replicated for period 2. Note that the 
decision sheet refers to the relevant part of the payoff sheet in every phase of the game. 
Hence, subjects could easily track the history of play.     
No explicit time limit was given to subjects. Nevertheless, the duration of no session 
exceeded the two hours that had been announced on the posters. The average duration of a 
session was about one hour and twenty minutes. At the end of the experiment, subjects 
received a monetary payment consisting of a show-up fee of 3 Euros plus the experimental 
payoff that was converted at a rate of 20 Eurocents per point. Payments to the subjects, 
including show-up fee, ranged from 4 to 44.6 Euros, with an average of 10.10 Euros (1 Euro 
exchanged at the rate of about $1 at the time). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 Appendix A containing the instructions used in the implementation of the experiment can be found in the 
online version at the JEBO website. 
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4. Experimental Evidence 
Table 2 contains information on the individual choices regarding cooperative effort and 
destruction in both periods of the game. In the first part of the table, the cooperative effort 
choices of rich and poor individuals are given for the first period. 
Table 2: Individual choices in the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 periods
a)
 
1. First period cooperative choices 
 Rich  Poor 
Treatment Dictator Nature 
Dictator-Nature 
differenceb)  Dictator Nature 
Dictator-Nature 
differenceb) 
Low inequality 2/8 3/7 n.s.  10/16 5/14 * 
High inequality 1/8 5/8 *  2/16 7/16 ** 
Low-High differenceb) n.s. n.s.   *** n.s.  
2. First period destruction choices 
Low inequality 0/8 0/7 n.s.  0/16 0/14 n.s. 
High inequality 0/8 1/8 n.s.  1/16 1/16 n.s. 
Low-High differenceb) n.s. n.s.   n.s. n.s.  
3. Second period cooperative choices 
Low inequality 2/8 1/7 n.s.  3/16 4/14 n.s. 
High inequality 1/8 3/8 n.s.  1/16 6/16 ** 
Low-High differenceb) n.s. n.s.   n.s. n.s.  
4. Second period destruction choices 
Low inequality 1/8 0/7 n.s.  1/16 1/14 n.s. 
High inequality 0/8 0/8 n.s.  2/16 1/16 n.s. 
Low-High differenceb) n.s. n.s.   n.s. n.s.  
a) The fractions i/j indicate the  number i of cooperative or destruction choices out of a total of j observations.  
b) All differences are tested using Fisher’s exact test with a two-tailed alternative hypothesis, where two-tailed 
significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = .02, ** = .05, * = .10, or n.s. = not significant.  
 
We first check whether the neutrality result found by Sadrieh and Verbon is replicated (i.e. 
whether the inclination to cooperate by rich and poor individuals is neutral to the degree of 
inequality in the nature treatment). According to Table 2, in the nature treatment, 3 out of 7 
low inequality economies show cooperative effort choices by the rich, while cooperation is 
exhibited for the high inequality economies in 5 out of 8 cases. This small difference 
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obviously is not statistically significant. Likewise, the difference in cooperative efforts 
provided by the poor (5 out of 14 in NatLo and 7 out of 16 in NatHi economies) is not 
significantly different. This gives support to the finding that inequality (when it emerges from 
a fair, but random process) is neutral and does not have any growth-enhancing or growth-
decreasing effects. This leads to our first result. 
Result 1: Inequality given by nature (a fair, but random process) does not have an effect on 
the level of cooperation by rich and poor individuals. 
Let us now turn to the dictator treatment. Remember that in that case the rich individual 
determines which distribution should be put in place before effort choices are made. Notice 
from table 2 that the rich are not much affected by their own choice of inequality: Only 2 of 
the 8 rich who choose low inequality as dictators also choose the cooperative action. This 
ratio is not significantly different from the ratio of one out of the 8 rich dictators who chooses 
high inequality and cooperation. The behavior of the poor, however, is significantly affected 
by the distribution that the dictator chooses: While 10 of 16 poor provide cooperatively high 
effort when low inequality has been chosen, only 2 of 16 cooperate when high inequality has 
been chosen. This difference in the number of cooperative plays is highly significant (α ≤ .01; 
two-tailed). Thus, if the dictator chooses low inequality, the poor reciprocate by putting more 
effort into generating returns on the capital stock. Hence, if the poor and powerless in an 
economy know that those who are in power have actively reduced the inequality, then they 
provide more effort to the benefit of the entire economy. On the other hand, dictators 
choosing high inequality seem to signal a self-serving attitude that induces a large majority of 
the poor to behave non-cooperatively. This is laid down in our second result. 
Result 2: In the dictator treatment the poor will provide more cooperative effort under low 
inequality than under high inequality. 
Page 14 of 37 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
14 
A key issue in this paper is the question of whether the way inequality arises has an effect on 
individual behavior. We can analyze this issue by comparing the effort choices in the dictator 
settings to the effort choices in the corresponding nature settings. Comparing across columns 
in Table 2 shows that under low inequality, the behavior of the rich is the same, no matter 
whether the distribution was randomly selected or was an explicit own choice: 3 of 7 rich in 
NatLo and 2 of 8 rich in DicLo provide cooperative efforts. In the case of high inequality, 
however, the rich are significantly (α ≤ .10; two-tailed) more cooperative in NatHi, where the 
income distribution is set by nature (5 out of 8), than in DicHi, where they chose high 
inequality distribution themselves (1 out of 8). Of course, there may be a selection bias here 
because the rich who choose high inequality can be expected to be less cooperative. 
For the poor the picture is even clearer. Under high inequality, the poor are significantly less 
cooperative (α ≤ .05; two-tailed) if the distribution has come about by willful choice of the 
rich dictator than if the distribution has been determined by nature: 2 of 16 poor cooperate in 
DicHi, while 7 of 16 do so in NatHi. Under low inequality we find the reverse: the poor are 
significantly (α ≤ .10; two-tailed) more cooperative when the rich choose the low inequality 
distribution than when it is put in place by nature (10 of 16 poor cooperate in DicLo, but only 
5 of 14 poor cooperate in NatLo). This leads to our third result. 
Result 3a: The poor are more cooperative when low inequality has been set by the dictator 
instead of by nature.  
Result 3b: The poor are less cooperative when high inequality has been set by the dictator 
instead of by nature. 
Notice that result 3b survives in the second period, but result 3a does not. As can be seen in 
the third part of Table 2, the case of poor in the DicLo treatment is the only case in which the 
general level of cooperation actually changes dramatically in the second period. In all other 
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cases, we observe about the same level of cooperation in the second period as we had 
observed in the first period. Thus, while the treatment difference in the low inequality setting 
disappears in the second period, the significant treatment difference in the high inequality 
setting persists. One plausible reason why cooperation decreases dramatically only in the 
DicLo case is that many of the poor choosing the cooperative action were disappointed that 
the dictators who chose the low inequality did not also choose the cooperative action.  
Result 3 makes clear that poor individuals reciprocate the “kind” act of a dictator choosing 
low inequality by exerting high productive efforts, but punish the “unkind” act of choosing 
high inequality by exerting low productive efforts. Note that the “punishment” of providing 
uncooperative efforts is not costly to the punisher because it is the best response strategy. The 
destruction option that all individuals in the economy have at the end of each period provides 
a quite different (and very costly) punishment possibility. If any individual chooses this 
option, the current period payoffs will be lost for all individuals. We expected that in 
particular poor subjects who feel that they have been unfairly treated by the dictator’s choice 
of the high inequality will use the sabotage action to “equalize” payoffs. From the second part 
of Table 2 it is clear that our expectation is not borne out by the data. Actually, this option is 
used rarely. Only 3 of the 93 individuals use this option in the first period, and they are 
dispersed over the treatments.7  In the fourth part of Table 2, we see that one rich and 5 poor 
individuals choose to destroy the returns of the second period. Obviously, destruction in this 
stage has no “educational” effect anymore, but it may be used as punishment because it 
                                                        
7 Looking at the individual choices in the cases in which destruction took place in the first period, we see the 
following. In the case where the rich individual chose destruction, the first period choice was BAA (where B 
indicates cooperation, A indicates Nash effort, and the choice of the rich is given first). Apparently the rich was 
disappointed that both poor chose A. In another case, one of the poor chose destruction, even though the dictator, 
who had chosen high inequality, showed “remorse” by choosing B in the first period. In the third case, the 
cooperating poor chose destruction apparently to punish the other poor who had chosen to free-ride in a NatHi 
session in which the rich had also chosen to cooperate. 
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affects the final payoffs.8 Apparently, almost all rich individuals choose to safeguard the 
payoff that they have generated, while some of the poor individuals care less for their final 
payoffs and remain willing to punish others.9 It seems interesting that in three of the five 
DicHi economies in which one of the subjects chooses the cooperative effort level, a 
destruction of the returns occurs. Apparently, when the dictator opts for high inequality, 
cooperation frequently is followed by destruction because cooperation by one player tends to 
stay an isolated act. 
Finally, it is interesting to observe that due to the low number of cooperative choices by the 
poor in DicHi economies, dictators choosing high inequality earn significantly less than the 
dictators choosing low inequality in DicLo. Table 3 shows that the difference in payoffs is not 
only significant, but also substantial: while the dictators choosing high inequality on average 
earn 43.13 experimental currency units, those choosing low inequality earn 77.50 on average. 
Moreover, Table 3 shows that the dictators who deliberately choose high inequality in DicHi 
also earn significantly and substantially less than the rich, who are put in the high inequality 
setting by chance in NatHi. Note, however, that the poor in DicHi do not earn significantly 
less than those in NatHi, even though the average earnings are slightly lower. Obviously, the 
Dictator-Nature distinction is not as crucial for the payoff of the poor as the extent of property 
rights that are given to them (i.e. the low- versus high-inequality distinction).   
                                                        
8 It might be noticed here that in no economy was the destruction option chosen twice. 
9 The one rich individual who chose to destroy was a very cooperative one. He opted for the low inequality 
distribution first and then chose the cooperative B twice. After he saw that neither of the two poor subjects chose 
to cooperate in the second period, he decided to destroy their (and his own) returns. 
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Table 3: Payoffsa) 
 Rich  Poor 
Treatment Dictator Nature 
Dictator-Nature 
differenceb)  Dictator Nature 
Dictator-Nature 
differenceb) 
Low inequality 77.50 73.57 n.s.  55.06 60.50 n.s. 
High inequality 43.13 86.13 **  21.94 27.50 n.s. 
Low-High differenceb) *** n.s.   *** ***  
a) Average payoffs are displayed in experimental currency units. 
b) All differences are tested using the Mann-Whitney U-test with a two-tailed alternative hypothesis, where 
two-tailed significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = .02, ** = .05, * = .10, or n.s. = not significant.   
 
Figure 1 shows the observed growth rate of every economy in the experiment normalized to 
Nash equilibrium growth.10 Bars above (below) the zero-line indicate economies that realized 
growth that was higher (lower) than equilibrium growth. The average growth rate in DicHi is 
substantially lower than the average growth rates of the other treatments. This comes as no 
surprise since growth is positively correlated to the number of cooperation choices, which is 
very low in DicHi. 
In the dictator treatments positive growth rates are obtained in 2 high inequality economies 
and 5 low inequality economies. In 3 high inequality economies sizable negative growth rates 
are observed, while this is the case in only 1 low inequality economy. As a result of these 
differences, the average growth rate is clearly positive at 0.13 in the low inequality setting, 
while it is negative at –0.07 and significantly lower in the high inequality setting (Mann-
Whitney U-test at 1%, one-tailed). In the nature treatments, positive growth rates are observed 
in 6 low and in 5 high inequality economies. Negative growth rates are observed in 3 high and 
in 1 low inequality economy. Apparently, in the nature treatment the effect of inequality on 
growth is inconclusive.  
                                                        
10 We derive the normalized growth rate by subtracting the Nash equilibrium growth rate, which occurs, if all 
individuals in all periods play their Nash equilibrium strategies, from the observed growth rate. 
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Figure 1 – Total growth for each economy and each treatment* 
*) Each bar represents an independent observation of growth per economy, sorted in a descending order. 
Comparing the nature and dictator treatments, it appears that the differences in growth for 
given low inequality are only minor: in the nature treatment 6 out of 7 economies realize 
positive growth rates, while this holds for 5 out of 8 economies in the dictator treatment. As a 
result, the average growth rate is only slightly and insignificantly lower in the dictator than 
the nature treatment: 0.13 compared to 0.16, correspondingly. In the high inequality setting, 
however, the differences are clearly discernible: 5 out of 8 economies in the nature treatment, 
but only 2 out of 8 economies in the dictator treatment realize positive growth rates with 
average growth rates of 0.11 and –0.07, correspondingly. The treatment difference is sizable 
and significant (Mann-Whitney U-test at 1%, one-tailed).  This leads to our fourth result. 
Result 4: Low inequality leads to higher growth than high inequality in the dictator 
treatment. No such effect can be observed in the nature treatment. 
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5. Empirical evidence on the growth-inequality relationship 
Our experimental results suggest that when free-riding behavior can harm economic 
development, the adverse effect of inequality on growth depends on the interaction of the 
degree and the genesis of inequality. In this section, we present very simple cross-section 
regression analyses that provide some rather basic evidence for the external validity of our 
experimental finding11. Checking our main hypothesis requires a measure of the genesis of 
inequality to be included in a standard regression of inequality on growth. In principle, the 
required variable should represent an evaluation of the “fairness” of the procedure (or the 
institutions) that historically led to the observed degree of inequality. If the procedure were 
fair, then we expect growth to be unaffected by inequality. If it were unfair, we expect to 
observe a strong negative correlation between inequality and growth.  
Obviously, while in the lab the fairness of the procedure can be controlled almost perfectly, 
there is no simple way to assess the genesis of inequality across countries. In actual fact, 
institutional weakness or strength of a country is a many-dimensional concept, witnessing the 
many indicators measuring institutional quality that are around to date12. In order to get an 
impression to what degree our experimental results are supported by macro data, we 
experimented with two indicators, respectively an indicator that focuses on one particular 
aspect and an indicator that encompasses several aspects of institutional weakness. The 
focused proxy for institutional quality is the degree of corruption in a country. People might 
perceive the genesis of inequality as especially unfair in societies in which a high degree of 
                                                        
11 An analogous exercise was conducted by Glaeser et al. who regress GDP growth on inequality and on a binary 
variable indicating whether a country has a “strong legal system” or not. They find that: “Inequality is bad for 
growth, but only in countries with poor rule of law” (p. 215).  
 
12 For example, Kaufmann et al. (1999) mention at least 31 different indicators that have been used in the 
empirical growth literature. 
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corruption governs economic activities. If corruption is indeed a good proxy, then we should 
observe that the adverse effect of inequality on growth mainly runs through the interaction of 
inequality and corruption. The other index of institutional quality is composed of several 
different institutional variables taken from Kaufmann et al. The advantage of using the latter 
measure in a growth regression is that as several variables are codetermining its value, the 
endogeneity problem will not be much of an issue. With a more focused variable such as 
corruption an endogeneity problem might exist, however, for instance if in poor low-growth 
countries corruption is commonly used as a means to complement individual incomes, or if 
corruption is also affecting inequality (Li et al., 2000).   
The dependent variable in our regressions is the GDP growth per capita over the period 1991-
2001 and is taken from the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”.13 We use an 
average over a relatively long period (ten years) to capture the long-run characteristics of the 
economies and to avoid cyclic short term effects as far as possible.  As a measure of 
inequality we use Gini coefficients. This measure ranges from 0 (complete equality) to 100 
(complete inequality). An issue that has received considerable attention in the literature is 
whether inequality of income or inequality of assets is the factor underlying growth 
differences between countries. To circumvent this debate we present results with income 
inequality and asset inequality, respectively. For the former measure we took data on 
household income inequality constructed by Galbraith and Kum (2005).14 For the latter 
measure, the initial distribution of land is commonly taken (see, e.g., Deininger and Olinto 
2000 and Lundberg and Squire 2003 from which sources we extract the FAO data that we 
use). We regress growth rates on measures of inequality. However, as is well known, such an 
                                                        
13 For details see the website: www.worldbank.orghttp://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html  
14 These data are claimed to be an improvement on the well-known data set developed by Deininger and Squire 
(1996). 
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exercise can be plagued by an endogeneity bias as growth can also affect inequality in many 
ways. Fortunately, Lundberg and Squire show that in a reduced-form growth can be written as 
a function of the initial inequality in land distribution. This provides us with an additional 
argument for presenting results with the initial distribution of land as a measure of inequality 
because we can check whether the endogeneity bias distorts our results. Finally, we 
experiment with a number of control variables that are frequently used in the empirical 
growth literature. We include the initial GDP (“initial Y” in Table 4) to take care of the 
catching-up effect by economies starting at low GDP levels; the investment-GDP ratio 
(Inv/Y) and the relative amounts of money spent on education (“Educate” in Table 4) both 
capture conventional causes for growth and provide an indication of the sectoral structure of 
the economy.15 With these variables we are able to construct a data set for about 80 countries.   
Note that in spite of the above precautions, we see the evidence provided here only as 
indicative for the empirical prevalence of the conjectured effect. A comprehensive empirical 
analysis would be clearly beyond the scope of our simple analysis and include a number of 
additional issues such as the question of inter-temporal effects that are neglected in our cross-
section analysis. We analyze how institutional quality and inequality interact in a comparison 
across countries in a specified period (i.e. the 1990s). This is in line with our experimental 
set-up where we compare different “economies” at the same time, but obviously, our 
                                                        
15 The observations on the control variables GDP and investment were taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. Education is defined by total enrollment in a specific level of education, regardless of  
age, expressed as a percentage of the school population corresponding to the same level of education in a given 
school-year. Source: UNESCO - Education Indicator –Category Participation  (www.unesco.org).  
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empirical results do not warrant policy conclusions as to the effect of redressing inequality 
and improving institutional quality within a country over time.16   
First, we show the effect of corruption on growth17. The corruption index that we use is 
constructed by Transparency International.18 The index, indicated by “Corrupt” in Table 4, 
describes the level of perceived corruption in each country using a collection of corruption 
and political risk indexes for the 1990s. We transferred the originally negative score into the 
range from 0 (low corruption) to 10 (high corruption) and took the average over the period 
1995-2000.  
Table 4 displays our regression results for six variants of the regression model and, for each 
model, the effect of inequality is captured by a Gini coefficient based on income (indicated by 
Income in the table) and the distribution of land (indicated by Land). The simple regressions 
in the rows (1) produce the effect of only inequality as an explanatory variable. Both asset and 
income inequality appear to exert the negative effect that is commonly found in cross-section 
studies.  
The second regressions in rows (2) add our corruption measure. If the income inequality 
measure is used, the quantitative effect of inequality is cut down by one half and made 
                                                        
16 As we do not employ time series, we remain silent on the issue of growth over time. Introducing the time 
dimension makes it inevitable to take more explicit account of changes in the structure of the economy because 
the relationship between inequality and growth is known to depend on the development of, in particular, the 
agricultural sector vis-à-vis the industrial sector (see Aghion et al.).  Moreover, if we add time series data to our 
cross-section data, we need to pay attention to the separation of country-specific from time-specific effects and 
to decide whether these effects are of a stochastic nature. Finally, because the Gini coefficients used are 
relatively stable over time within countries (see Deininger and Squire), we would need (especially for 
developing countries) infeasible long time series to get enough variation of inequality over time. 
17 The effect of corruption on growth was first measured by Mauro (1995), who finds an adverse effect of 
corruption. Ehrlich and Lui (1999), in a somewhat more elaborate model, also find significant adverse effects of 
corruption variables on growth. Neither paper, however, includes an inequality measure in the analysis. Li et al. 
include inequality and consider the effect of corruption on inequality. However, they do not include any possible 
interaction effects of inequality and corruption on growth.  
18 For details see the website: http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/cpi2002.en.html 
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insignificant. If we use land inequality the addition of corruption decreases the effect by 10%, 
but the effect remains significant. This suggests that corruption and income inequality may 
not be measured independently of each other, while if land inequality is used the measure of 
corruption and inequality are apparently orthogonal. Rows (3) add the controls as explanatory 
variables into rows (1). The explained variance increases substantially, but relative to rows (1) 
the direction of the effect of inequality does not change and remains significant, although the 
quantitative effect of inequality decreases by about a third. The bias these (and possibly other 
omitted) controls are exerting on the parameter of the inequality measures should, therefore, 
not prevent us from interpreting the empirical results.  
Rows (4) add controls as explanatory variables into rows (2). Interestingly, compared to rows 
(2) income inequality regains its explanatory power, while compared to rows (3), where 
corruption is left out, the effect of inequality is almost the same. Apparently, some of the 
correlation between income inequality and corruption is neutralized by introducing the 
controls. If we use the distribution of land as the inequality measure, the effect of inequality 
on growth can be measured independently of corruption in all cases. Both the coefficients of 
inequality and corruption have the expected negative signs and have increased compared to 
rows (2). The explanatory power increases compared to all regressions in rows (1)-(3).  
The regressions in rows (5) include an interaction term between inequality and corruption, 
indicated by C*Gini. Once again, the explanatory power of the regression increases. The 
coefficient for the interaction term takes on a negative and highly significant value, but the 
coefficients for inequality and corruption have changed their signs and are no longer 
significant, thus supporting the result that the interaction between inequality and corruption is 
more decisive for growth than either of the two variables separately. However, the regressions 
also indicate that in the absence of corruption, inequality actually can have a growth 
Page 24 of 37 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
24 
enhancing effect. This is in line with theories that predict growth to be positively correlated to 
inequality due to the higher marginal propensity of the rich to save19, so that inequality can 
have a positive investment effect and a negative social capital effect, as has been discussed in 
the field before (see Aghion et al., Barro). Finally, the positive inequality-growth relationship 
is empirically non-significant in our regressions, however. In the regressions (6), we drop all 
non-significant variables. Then we are left with the result that under high corruption 
(index=10) there will be a significant negative effect of inequality on growth. Under low 
corruption (index=0), however, the degree of inequality is irrelevant to growth.  
Table 4. Inequality, Corruption, and Growth 
  Constant Gini Corrupt C*Gini Initial Y Inv/Y Educate Adj. R2 
(1) Income  5.704 
(1.289) 
-0.102 
(0.032) 
     0.13 
(1) Land  4.578 
(0.816) 
-0.040 
(0.012) 
     0.19 
(2) Income  5.094 
(1.099) 
-0.050 
(0.033) 
-0.271 
(0.083) 
    0.25 
(2) Land  5.132 
(0.860) 
-0.035 
(0.012) 
-0.151 
(0.069) 
    0.24 
(3) Income  3.314 
(1.644) 
-0.071 
(0.031) 
   0.005 
(0.039) 
 0.139 
(0.053) 
 0.008 
(0.010) 
0.36 
(3) Land  3.140 
(0.741) 
-0.032 
(0.010) 
  -0.044 
(0.034) 
 0.208 
(0.046) 
 0.020 
(0.009) 
0.52 
(4) Income  7.656 
(1.780) 
-0.077 
(0.029) 
-0.411 
(0.121) 
 -0.132 
(0.059) 
 0.117 
(0.045) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
0.44 
(4) Land  4.636 
(1.439) 
-0.034 
(0.010) 
-0.272 
(0.132) 
 -0.128 
(0.054) 
 0.185 
(0.047) 
 0.012 
(0.009) 
0.58 
(5) Income  2.261 
(3.321) 
 0.077 
(0.081) 
 0.556 
(0.497) 
-0.026 
(0.013) 
-0.111 
(0.056) 
 0.123 
(0.034) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
0.47 
(5) Land  1.546 
(1.778) 
 0.011 
(0.017) 
 0.298 
(0.254) 
-0.009 
(0.003) 
-0.118 
(0.053) 
 0.179 
(0.046) 
 0.014 
(0.011) 
0.63 
(6) Income  4.681 
(0.874) 
  -0.012 
(0.003) 
-0.142 
(0.050) 
 0.124 
(0.044) 
 0.46 
(6) Land  4.025 
(0.626) 
  -0.006 
(0.001) 
-0.124 
(0.037) 
 0.179 
(0.032) 
 0.58 
Dependent variable: Ten year average GDP growth per capita (1991-2001);  
 
                                                        
19 Our experiment was not designed to check for this effect because savings decision are not modeled. 
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Next, in Table 5 we present the results with the more encompassing measure of institutional 
quality (IQ). Institutional quality is measured by combining three measures in the Kaufmann 
et al. database (i.e. rule of law, regulatory burden and graft). We again transfer the obtained 
IQ score onto the range from 0 (strong institutional quality) to 10 (weak institutional quality) 
in order to make the results comparable to those in Table 4.  
Table 5. Inequality, institutional quality (IQ)*), and Growth 
  Constant Gini IQ IQ*Gini Initial Y Inv/Y Educate Adj. R2 
(1) Income  5.704 
(1.289) 
 
-0.102 
(0.032) 
     0.13 
(1) Land  4.578 
(0.816) 
-0.040 
(0.012) 
     0.19 
(2) Income 6.067 
(1.117) 
-0.056 
(0.040) 
-0.492 
(0.173) 
    0.25 
(2) Land 5.499 
(0.894) 
-0.034 
(0.011) 
-0.301 
(0.124) 
    0.23 
(3) Income  3.314 
(1.644) 
-0.071 
(0.031) 
   0.005 
(0.039) 
 0.139 
(0.053) 
 0.008 
(0.010) 
0.36 
(3) Land  3.140 
(0.741) 
-0.032 
(0.010) 
  -0.044 
(0.034) 
 0.208 
(0.046) 
 0.020 
(0.009) 
0.52 
(4) Income 10.045 
(1.575) 
-0.065  
(0.027) 
-1.013 
(0.171) 
 -0.190 
(0.048) 
0.109 
(0.042) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
0.51 
(4) Land 7.604 
(1.593) 
-0.029 
(0.009) 
-0.844 
(0.214) 
 -0.192 
(0.049) 
0.172 
0.040 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.62 
(5) Income 5.042 
(3.766) 
0.064 
(0.087) 
0.081 
(0.862) 
-0.028
(0.020) 
-0.167 
(0.055) 
0.114 
(0.045) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
0.51 
(5) Land 4.019 
(2.560) 
0.012 
(0.025) 
-0.064  
(0.504) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.169 
(0.050) 
0.172 
(0.031) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
0.63 
(6) Income 6.053 
(1.079) 
  -0.021 
(0.004) 
-0.186 
(0.050) 
0.136 
(0.047) 
 0.51 
(6) Land 4.302 
(0.588) 
  -0.009 
(0.001) 
-0.112 
(0.032) 
0.184 
(0.030) 
 0.63 
Dependent variable: Ten year average GDP growth per capita (1991-2001);  Standard errors in parentheses. 
*) IQ has been measured such that higher quantitative values represent a lower standard. 
 
Notice from Table 5 that the size of the negative effect of bad institutional quality on growth, 
if measured in isolation, rows (2), is even larger than in Table 4. Apart from that, the results in 
Table 5 are strikingly similar to those in Table 4. In particular, for this specification of 
institutional quality, the interaction term of IQ and the Gini coefficient is statistically 
significant negative again. See row (6) of the table. Thus, the negative effect of procedural 
fairness on growth appears to be rather robust: the combined effect of large inequality and 
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weak institutions (high IQ) on the growth rate is strongly negative. Moreover, also for this 
specification both the IQ measure and the Gini coefficient can change signs and become 
insignificant after including the interaction term. Therefore, the finding that inequality is 
harming growth only when bad institutions are in place is replicated with this alternative 
measure of institutional quality.  
6. Conclusions  
Both the empirical and the theoretical research on the relationship between inequality and 
growth have come to ambiguous results, sometimes finding a positive, sometimes a negative, 
and sometimes varying correlations (Aghion et al., Barro). It seems that more theoretical and 
experimental work on the behavioral micro-foundations will be necessary to untangle the 
complicated mechanisms that govern the relationship between inequality and growth. In a 
first paper, we put Knack and Keefer’s conjecture that inequality destroys “social capital” to a 
direct experimental test, but found no evidence whatsoever in support of it: the observed level 
of cooperation was independent of the implemented degree of inequality (Sadrieh and 
Verbon). Given this result, it seems evident that something more than inequality by itself is 
needed to observe the collapse of societal cooperation.  
The hypothesis we started this paper with is that the degree of cooperation not only depends 
on the degree of inequality, but also on its genesis. To be able to examine this hypothesis, we 
first introduce a model that allows for efficient, mutual cooperation in an unequal income 
setting. We then conduct laboratory experiments using this model in two variants. In the 
nature variant, the degree of inequality (either high or low inequality) is selected by the 
experimenter at random. In the dictator variant, the degree of inequality is selected by the 
only “rich” individual in the 3-person economy. The results of the experiment are as 
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conjectured: inequality is only detrimental to cooperation and, thus, to growth, when it is 
deliberately chosen by the rich dictator. As in the previous experiment, inequality has no 
effect when it is brought on by a random draw (i.e. by a “fair procedure”). Our results are in 
line with the results found by Bolton et al., who tested experimentally the effect of the 
procedures used on the acceptability of choices in games with biased outcomes. One of their 
conclusions is that biased allocations are less acceptable for those who are on the short end of 
things when chosen by a biased procedure. Within our experimental setting the conclusion is 
that inequality brought about by an unfair procedure (i.e. the dictator treatment) will have a 
negative effect on the willingness to cooperate. Inequality in societies with weak institutions 
will, therefore, be detrimental to growth.  
In an attempt to give these micro-level results some macroeconomic substance, we ran simple 
regressions of cross-country data on per-capita growth, inequality, and measures of 
institutional strength, including a number of macroeconomic control variables that are 
commonly found in the empirical growth literature. We used two measures of institutional 
strength (or weakness) in turn (i.e. corruption and a more composite measure, including rule 
of law, regulatory burden and graft). For both measures of institutional quality, the 
regressions vindicate one of our central experimental results: that fair procedures strongly 
determine the willingness to cooperate, and thus growth, in countries. With all due caveats in 
interpreting such simple regression models, the effect seems to be robust and strong enough to 
allow confidence in its support for our hypothesis. The adverse effect on growth is entirely 
captured by the interaction term of inequality and the institutional quality, leaving no 
independent role for inequality or corruption.  
Our result strongly supports the spreading view that the real output effects of inequality are 
linked to the institutions governing the economy. The special contribution of our paper is to 
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show a new channel through which this interaction may be effective. The channel we suggest 
and examine is that of voluntary cooperation in a social dilemma type situation. The idea is 
that a substantial part of the effort that is put into production by the labor force is non-
verifiable and, hence, will be dependent on the individual’s trust and emotional attachment to 
the society. Clearly, these may both be severely damaged by inequality that results from the 
actions of a self-serving dictator, but not by inequality emerging from fair competition.  
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 Appendix A – Instructions 
This is an experiment on economic decision-making within groups over 2 periods. These instructions explain the 
workings of the experiment and if you follow them carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money, 
which will be paid to you in cash. You are expected to make decisions on your own without consulting other 
participants. So, please, do not communicate with the other participants. Otherwise, we might have to stop the 
experiment.  
How does this experiment work? Each group consists of 3 participants, so you are in a group with 2 others in 
the room but you will not be able to identify your group members. The group members will be indicated by a 
color: Red, Blue, and Green. For the purposes of this instruction we will just talk of “your group members”. At 
the beginning of period 1, each group member has some amount of start capital. At least one of your group 
members will have a start capital that differs from yours.  The start capital that you get can be relatively low, or 
it can be relatively high. Which of the two will hold for you will be decided by the Red player, who in both cases 
will have the highest start capital in your group. Of course, if you happen to be the Red player you will decide on 
your own and the others’ start capital.  
Whatever your start capital may be you can enlarge your start capital over two periods by making a decision 
each period. These decisions determine the return that you are earning on your capital. The development of your 
capital does not only depend on your own decisions, but also on the decisions of the other members of your 
group. Based on these decisions, at the end of the 2nd period you will have accumulated a certain amount of final 
capital. From this final capital the start capital will be subtracted resulting in the payoffs that determine your 
earnings out of this experiment.  
In each period, each group member chooses simultaneously one of two options: A or B. As will become clear 
from the payoff sheets to be discussed in a moment, if all group members choose B, the capital of all group 
members will grow more than if all choose A. However, if you choose B alone, while the other group members 
choose A, your capital will grow less while the others’ capital will grow more, than if you had chosen A. 
Consider the 2 payoff sheets on your desk. These sheets contain important information on your payoff during the 
experiment. However, if we start playing the experiment, only 1 of the two payoff sheets are relevant for your 
decisions. Which payoff tables that will be, depends on the Red player’s decision. If the Red player chooses the 
start capital of 220 for him- or herself and 40 for Blue and Green, payoff sheet 1 is relevant to all of you. But if 
the Red player chooses the start capital of 120 for him- or herself and 90 for Blue and Green, payoff sheets 2 is 
relevant to all of you. 
Let us assume that a payoff sheet 1 is relevant. But, the same reasoning applies if payoff sheet 2 is relevant. For 
that case, just change in the following, payoff sheet 1 into payoff sheet 2. When you decide on A or B in the 1st 
period, you do not know your group members’ 1st period choices. However, if you choose A in the 1st period, 
then, whatever the choices of your group members, payoff sheet 1 LEFT is from then on relevant for you. On the 
other hand, if you choose B in the 1st period, payoff sheet 1 RIGHT is relevant. So, a choice between A or B is a 
choice between payoff sheets 1 LEFT and 1 RIGHT. The structure of payoff sheets 1 LEFT and 1 RIGHT is 
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identical. It suffices, therefore, to consider one of those payoff sheets only. Let us look at payoff sheet 1 LEFT, 
where your 1st period decision is A. Omit for a moment the table at the center of the page, saying, “If 1st period 
choice was Reset”.   
Payoff sheet 1 LEFT  shows 4 payoff tables. These tables give the possible payoff you and your group members 
will generate, depending on you and your group members’ 2nd period choices. The letters in the rows of those 
tables show the decisions of your group (including yourself) in period 2 and the numbers show the final payoff 
for you and your group members corresponding to these decisions. The first of those numbers is always your 
final payoff, while the next two numbers are those of your group members. Which of these four tables is relevant 
for you will depend on the 1st period choice of your group members. If they both choose A, then the first table 
saying “If 1st period choice was (A, A, A)” is relevant, but if the first other group member chooses A and the 
other one chooses B the second table saying “If 1st period choice was (A, A, B)” is relevant. The other two tables 
will be relevant, if the first other group member chooses B, and the other chooses A, or when they both choose 
B, respectively. In payoff sheet 1 RIGHT you will notice that the first letter in the headings of the payoff tables 
is not A, but B, corresponding with a 1st period decision of yours of B instead of A. 
Once all 1st period decisions on A or B are made, the experimenter will collect all the decision sheets, and return 
them with the decisions of your group members on A or B included. Then yo  will know exactly which payoff 
table on the left-hand side of the payoff sheet is relevant for you. Notice that in your payoff table the payoffs of 
your group members are shown as well. To help you the experimenter will mark this table with a cross.  
After all group members know their payoff table, each group member is given a reset option. If one group 
member chooses to reset, then the capital of every group member after the 1st period will be reset to the start 
capital. What this implies for the payoff is shown by the “Reset” table at CENTER of Payoff sheet 1. You or one 
of your group members might prefer the Reset option over and above the relevant table at the left-hand side of 
the Payoff sheet.   
The experimenter will communicate to all group members whether there has been a reset, or not. If not, then the 
table at the left-hand side that was marked with a cross will be the table that is decisive for your final payoff. 
But, if there has been a reset, table CENTER on the page is decisive. 
After the decision whether or not to reset, the 2nd period starts. In the 2nd period again each group member 
chooses simultaneously from one of two options: A or B. Like in the 1st period, when you decide on A or B, you 
do not know your group members’ 2nd period choices. If you choose A, then the first four rows in your relevant 
table shows you the possible payoffs for you and your group members. If you choose B, then the last four rows 
in your relevant table show you the possible payoffs for you and your group members. Which of those four rows 
is decisive for your final payoff depends on your group members. 
After everyone has decided on A or B, the experimenter will collect the decision sheets and return them with the 
decision of your group members. Then you will know exactly which row in your payoff table is relevant for you. 
To help you the experimenter will mark this row with a cross. Again, after all group members have decided for 
A or B in the 2nd period, each group member is given a reset option. If one group member chooses to reset, then 
the capital of every group member after the 2nd period will be reset to the start capital of the 2nd period. What this 
implies for the final payoff is shown by the bottom row of the table saying, “Reset”. You or one of your group 
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members might prefer the Reset option over and above the relevant rows in your payoff table. Notice that if you 
are already in the Reset table, a reset choice in your group will lead to zero final payoffs for all group members. 
This is due to a choice for reset in the 1st and the 2nd period, which implies that the final capital for you and your 
group members equals the start capital. As a result  the payoff for any of your group members, including 
yourself, equals the show-up fee. 
The experimenter will collect all decisions on the reset option and thereafter communicate to all group members 
whether there has been a reset, or not. If not, then the row in the table that was marked with a cross will be 
decisive for your final payoff. But, if there has been a reset, the bottom row of the table is decisive for your final 
payoff. 
The final payoff will be exchanged into earnings at the rate of 20 cent per point. Your total earnings from the 
experiment are paid to you at the end of the experiment in cash. Additionally, each of you will receive a fixed 
payment of 3 Euro for participation in the experiment. 
Summarizing. First the Red player decides on the distribution of capital. That choice determines whether the 
Payoff sheet 1 or Payoff sheet 2 is used. Your own 1st period choice determines whether sheet 1 LEFT or sheet 1 
RIGHT (or, sheet 2 LEFT or sheet 2 RIGHT) is decisive for your and the others’ payoff. The 1st period choices 
of your group members fix the table on the left/right-hand side of the relevant payoff sheet. However, if you or 
one of your group members chooses to reset in the 1st period, the “Reset” table on the center of the sheet is 
decisive.  The 2nd period choices of you and your group members determine which row in the chosen table is 
going to be decisive for the payoffs. However, if any one in your group (including yourself) has opted for a reset 
in the 2nd period, the bottom row in the chosen table sets the payoffs for all group members. 
Practice rounds. Before running the actual experiments, we give you the opportunity to have some practice. For 
these practice rounds you can use the payoff sheets on your desk, which are also used for the actual experiment. 
Moreover, you can use the practice sheets, which are handed out to you now. You will not be paid for the results 
of these rounds, these rounds are only meant to let you become acquainted with the structure of the experiment. 
First, we play two practice rounds together for payoff sheets 1. After that, we play two practice rounds together 
for payoff sheets 2.   
During these rounds I announce what you and your group members are hypothetically doing. This information is 
indicated on your group-practice sheets by A1.1, etc. You indicate on your guided-practice sheets which payoff 
sheets, tables, or payoffs are relevant behind the questions Q1.1. etc.  
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Appendix B – Payoff Sheets 
Payoff sheet of the rich in the high inequality treatment (Gini = .6).  
The other payoff sheets contained exactly the same information, but the columns of the tables were sorted in a 
way that had each subject’s own payoff in the first column.  
 
PAYOFF SHEET LEFT  
START CAPITAL (220, 40, 40)  
Payoff tables, if your 1st  choice was A  
 
PAYOFF SHEET CENTER  
START CAPITAL (220, 40, 40)  
If 1st period choice was Reset  
 
PAYOFF SHEET RIGHT  
START CAPITAL (220, 40, 40)  
Payoff tables, if your 1st choice was B  
                       
If 1st period choice was (A, A, A)          If 1st period choice was (B, A, A) 
Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue          Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue 
A A A  44 26 26          A A A  39 34 34 
A A B  84 35 19          A A B  78 44 27 
A B A  84 19 35          A B A  78 27 44 
A B B  123 28 28          A B B  117 37 37 
B A A  36 35 35          B A A  32 44 44 
B A B  76 43 28          B A B  71 54 37 
B B A  76 28 43          B B A  71 37 54 
B B B  116 36 36          B B B  110 47 47 
 Reset   20 12 12           Reset   13 18 18 
                       
If 1st period choice was (A, A, B)  If 1st period choice was Reset  If 1st period choice was (B, A, B) 
Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue 
A A A  81 35 19  A A A  20 12 12  A A A  77 43 27 
A A B  127 44 11  A A B  56 18 5  A A B  122 54 19 
A B A  127 27 26  A B A  56 5 18  A B A  122 35 36 
A B B  173 36 18  A B B  93 12 12  A B B  167 46 28 
B A A  73 44 26  B A A  13 18 18  B A A  69 54 36 
B A B  119 54 18  B A B  50 25 12  B A B  114 65 28 
B B A  119 36 34  B B A  50 12 25  B B A  114 46 44 
B B B  165 46 26  B B B  87 19 19  B B B  159 56 36 
 Reset   56 18 5   Reset   0 0 0   Reset   50 25 12 
                       
If 1st period choice was (A, B, A)          If 1st period choice was (B, B, A) 
Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue          Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue 
A A A  81 19 35          A A A  77 27 43 
A A B  127 26 27          A A B  122 36 35 
A B A  127 11 44          A B A  122 19 54 
A B B  173 18 36          A B B  167 28 46 
B A A  73 26 44          B A A  69 36 54 
B A B  119 34 36          B A B  114 44 46 
B B A  119 18 54          B B A  114 28 65 
B B B  165 26 46          B B B  159 36 56 
 Reset   56 5 18           Reset   50 12 25 
                       
If 1st period choice was (A, B, B)          If 1st period choice was (B, B, B) 
Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue   Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue 
A A A  119 27 27   A A A  115 35 35 
A A B  171 36 18   A A B  166 45 27 
A B A  171 18 36   A B A  166 27 45 
A B B  223 27 27   A B B  217 36 36 
B A A  110 36 36   B A A  106 45 45 
B A B  162 44 27   B A B  157 55 36 
B B A  162 27 44   B B A  157 36 55 
B B B  215 36 36   B B B  208 46 46 
 Reset   93 12 12  
The tables on the left and right -hand 
side are decisive for your payoff if 
there has been no reset in the 1st period. 
If there has been a reset, the CENTER 
table determines your payoff. The last 
row of any table will be the payoff if 
there has been a reset in the 2nd period. 
Letters in the rows are 2nd-period 
choices of you and your group 
members Green and Blue; Numbers are 
the corresponding payoffs for you, 
Green and Blue.   Reset   87 19 19 
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Payoff sheet of the rich in the low inequality treatment (Gini = .1).  
The other payoff sheets contained exactly the same information, but the columns of the tables were sorted in a 
way that had each subject’s own payoff in the first column.  
 
PAYOFF SHEET LEFT  
START CAPITAL (120, 90, 90)  
Payoff tables, if your 1
st
  choice was A  
 
PAYOFF SHEET CENTER  
START CAPITAL (120, 90, 90)  
If 1
st
 period choice was Reset  
 
PAYOFF SHEET RIGHT  
START CAPITAL (120, 90, 90)  
Payoff tables, if your 1
st
 choice was B  
                       
If 1st period choice was (A, A, A)          If 1st period choice was (B, A, A) 
Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue          Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue 
A A A  53 47 47          A A A  47 64 64 
A A B  77 65 39          A A B  70 85 56 
A B A  77 39 65          A B A  70 56 85 
A B B  101 58 58          A B B  93 77 77 
B A A  45 65 65          B A A  39 85 85 
B A B  69 84 58          B A B  62 106 77 
B B A  69 58 84          B B A  62 77 106 
B B B  93 76 76          B B B  85 98 98 
 Reset   24 21 21           Reset   18 36 36 
                       
If 1st period choice was (A, A, B)  If 1st period choice was Reset  If 1st period choice was (B, A, B) 
Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue 
A A A  76 65 40  A A A  24 21 21  A A A  71 82 58 
A A B  103 86 32  A A B  44 36 15  A A B  97 106 50 
A B A  103 56 58  A B A  44 15 36  A B A  97 73 78 
A B B  131 77 50  A B B  64 30 30  A B B  123 97 69 
B A A  68 86 58  B A A  18 36 36  B A A  62 106 78 
B A B  95 107 50  B A B  38 51 30  B A B  88 129 69 
B B A  95 77 75  B B A  38 30 51  B B A  88 97 98 
B B B  122 98 67  B B B  58 45 45  B B B  114 120 89 
 Reset   44 36 15   Reset   0 0 0   Reset   38 51 30 
                       
If 1st period choice was (A, B, A)          If 1st period choice was (B, B, A) 
Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue          Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue 
A A A  76 40 65          A A A  71 58 82 
A A B  103 58 56          A A B  97 78 73 
A B A  103 32 86          A B A  97 50 106 
A B B  131 50 77          A B B  123 69 97 
B A A  68 58 86          B A A  62 78 106 
B A B  95 75 77          B A B  88 98 97 
B B A  95 50 107          B B A  88 69 129 
B B B  122 67 98          B B B  114 89 120 
 Reset   44 15 36           Reset   38 30 51 
                       
If 1st period choice was (A, B, B)          If 1st period choice was (B, B, B) 
Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue   Red Green Blue  Red Green Blue 
A A A  99 58 58   A A A  93 76 76 
A A B  129 78 50   A A B  123 99 67 
A B A  129 50 78   A B A  123 67 99 
A B B  160 70 70   A B B  153 89 89 
B A A  90 78 78   B A A  84 99 99 
B A B  121 98 70   B A B  114 121 89 
B B A  121 70 98   B B A  114 89 121 
B B B  151 89 89   B B B  143 112 112 
 Reset   64 30 30  
The tables on the left and right -hand 
side are decisive for your payoff if 
there has been no reset in the 1st period. 
If there has been a reset, the CENTER 
table determines your payoff. The last 
row of any table will be the payoff if 
there has been a reset in the 2nd period. 
Letters in the rows are 2nd-period 
choices of you and your group 
members Green and Blue; Numbers are 
the corresponding payoffs for you, 
Green and Blue.   Reset   58 45 45 
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Appendix C – Decision Sheet   
Decision Sheet for period 1: You Are BLUE. 
My start capital  Start capital for GREEN  Start capital for RED 
  70    70     160 
My choice in period 1(Please indicate with mark  “X ” in the box) 
                      A  
                      B             
Make a decision up to this point and wait for the experimenter. 
 
To be filled by the experimenter, 
 
Choice of Blue   A          B 
Choice of Green A    B 
Choice of Red    A    B 
Based on these choices your payoff table is the table saying “If first-period choice was (      ,       
,      ). Do you want to reset and, as a result, switch to the “Reset” table as the table that is 
decisive for your final payoff? Indicate your choice by marking “X” in the box. 
 
 Reset Do not reset 
 
Make a decision up to this point and wait for the experimenter 
 
To be filled by the experimenter 
 
 
Choice of Blue   Reset   YES           NO 
 
Choice of Green Reset   YES        NO  
 
Choice of Red    Reset   YES        NO  
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Decision Sheet for period 2: You Are BLUE. 
 
My payoff table is the table:  “If 1st period was (      ,       ,      )“  on payoff sheet …. 
 
 
My choice (Blue) in period 2  (Please indicate with mark  “X ” in the box) 
 
                      A  
 
                      B             
 
 
Make a decision up to this point and wait for the experimenter. 
 
To be filled by the experimenter. 
 
Choice of  Blue    A B  
 
Choice of Green  A B  
 
Choice of Red     A       B 
 
 
Based on these your payoff is given by the row (        ,        ,      ), and the corresponding 
payoffs for you and your group members is (       ,         ,          )        
 
Do you want to reset and, as a result, switch to the “Reset” row in your table as the row that is 
decisive for your final payoff? Indicate your choice by marking “X” in the box. 
 
Reset      Do not reset 
 
 
Make a decision up to this point and wait for the experimenter 
 
 
To be filled out by the experimenter 
 
Choice of Blue   Reset   YES           NO 
 
Choice of Green Reset   YES        NO  
 
Choice of Red    Reset   YES        NO  
 
The final payoff for you and your group members is  (        ,         ,        )  
 
YOUR EARNINGS:    XX show-up fee + xx Cent x  payoff 
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